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1  INTRODUCTION  
The judgment in Nape v INTCS Corporate 
Solutions (Pty) Ltd (Nape)1 concerned 
the proper interpretation of section 198 
of the Labour Relations Act (LRA)2 
where employees have been dismissed 
at the instance of a client in terms of a 
labour broking agreement. The decision 
illustrates the problems encountered by 
employees providing services to a client 
in terms of these agreements and the 
need for the broker’s right of recourse 
against its client in order to give effect 
to the employee’s right to fair labour 
practices. The main thrust of this article 
focuses on the need to regulate the 
relationship between the employee, 
                                                 
1 (2010) 31 ILJ 2120 (LC). 
2 Act 66 of 1995. 
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client and labour broker and the impact of the amendments introduced by the Labour 
Relations Amendment Act (Amendment Act)3 on the existing law on temporary 
employment services in terms of section 198 of the LRA. It is instructive to point out 
that the amendments introduce certain provisions in an attempt to cast the net wider in 
order to protect employees in labour broking arrangements. It is axiomatic that these 
amendments have introduced far-reaching changes into the law on and practices of 
temporary employment services. This article raises a number of issues which are likely 
to be the subject of continual interpretation by the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and labour courts. It starts with an analysis of the 
judgment in Nape to illustrate the challenges faced by employees in temporary 
employment services in enforcing their rights, for example in disputes involving unfair 
dismissal against the client. It will then address the possible effects of the amendments 
with a view to illustrating that, although these amendments provide some 
improvements to the existing section 198 of the LRA, they have regrettably failed to 
address some uncertainties on the application and interpretation of this section, and 
have in turn compounded the problem by introducing additional uncertainties. It is not 
the aim of this article to deal in more detail with all the different aspects of the 
amendments, however, the article reflects on a few of the most important changes to 
section 198A of the LRA which affect the regulation of temporary employment services 
in South Africa. Finally, this article will argue that the regulation of temporary 
employment services without an effective remedy of the labour broker and/or its 
employee against the client does not adequately protect and promote the employees’ 
right to fair labour practice.  
2 THE REGULATION OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SERVICES UNDER 
SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR LAW 
Section 198 of the LRA and section 82 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
(BCEA)4 specifically regulate the employment of persons whose services are procured 
for or provided to a client by a labour broker. Section 198(1) the LRA defines a 
“temporary employment service” to mean “any person who, for reward procures for or 
provides to a client other persons who perform work for the client; and (b) who are 
remunerated by the temporary employment service”.5 Section 198(2) of the LRA further 
provides that the labour broker is the employer of persons whose services have been 
procured or provided to a client. However, section 198(3) of the LRA expressly provides 
that a person who provides services to a client as an “independent contractor” is not an 
employee of the labour broker or of the client.6 Section 198 (4) of the LRA sets out the 
various contraventions for which the client and labour broker are jointly and severally 
liable to the employee of the labour broker. However, these contraventions do not 
include cases of unfair dismissal. Therefore in claims involving unfair dismissal the 
                                                 
3 Act 6 of 2014. The Labour Relations Amendment Act took effect on 10 January 2015. 
4 Act 75 of 1997. 
5 Section 82(1)-(3) of the BCEA also contain similar provisions. 
6 See Grogan J Workplace law 9th ed (Cape Town: Juta & Co 2007) at 27-28 and Van Niekerk et al Law 
@work 3rd ed (Durban: LexisNexis 2015) at 69. 
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employee has a cause of action against the labour broker and not the client or both.7 The 
decision of Bado, AJ, in Nape is of great importance in the interpretation of the 
application of section 198 of the LRA for the following two reasons. First, it rigorously 
addresses the issue of dismissals in the context of employees involved in labour broking 
arrangements, and secondly, it also contains a detailed analysis of the relevant legal 
principles which could provide the employee with a right of recourse against the client 
in the context of temporary employment services.  
3 THE SALIENT FACTS IN THE NAPE  
The dispute in Nape arose in the context of dismissal after one Simon Nape (the 
applicant) misconducted himself by sending an e-mail containing offensive material at 
the client’s premises to one individual. The client, Nissan (Pty) Ltd, invoked its 
contractual rights and demanded that Nape should be removed from the client’s 
premises by the respondent (INTCS Corporate Solutions (Pty) Ltd), its labour broker. 
The respondent, as his employer, suspended him and, after a disciplinary enquiry, 
determined that the appropriate sanction was a final written warning rather than 
dismissal. Although Nape agreed to a final written warning, Nissan was not satisfied and 
refused him access to its premises. The labour broker proceeded to retrench him 
because there was no alternative employment with any of its clients. 
The applicant then challenged the fairness of his dismissal based on operational 
requirements, in the Labour Court in terms of section 189 of the LRA. The respondent 
argued that the dismissal was fair because it complied with the contractual obligation 
between the client and the employer (labour broker) whereby termination could be 
effected on any ground acceptable under law. The termination was based on the fact 
that the labour broker had to pay the employee’s salary without receiving any value 
from the client, since the client had acted within its contractual rights to terminate the 
payment.  
4 THE DECISION IN THE NAPE  
4.1 The respondent’s reliance on section 189 of the LRA 
The main issue to be determined by the court was whether the retrenchment of the 
applicant from the employment of the respondent, a labour broker, was unfair, and if so, 
what the appropriate remedy was under those circumstances? The respondent argued 
that the dismissal was fair because it was entitled to invoke section 189 of the LRA8 and 
there was nothing more it could do, because the client had acted within its contractual 
powers that the applicant be removed from its premises. It relied on the judgment in 
Lebowa Platinum Mines Ltd v Hill (Lebowa Platinum Mines Ltd)9 which is authority 
                                                 
7 Generally, see Van Niekerk et al (2015) at 68-72 for a detailed discussion of temporary employment 
services under South African labour law. 
8 Section 189 of the LRA provides for the substantive and procedural requirements of a fair dismissal 
based on operational reasons of the employer (retrenchment). 
9 [1998] 7 BLLR 666 (LAC). 
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concerning dismissal at the behest of third parties. Further, it submitted that there was 
nothing it could do in response to the client’s demand, because the latter had superior 
bargaining power as a large client. In deciding on the fairness of the dismissal, the 
Labour Court had to determine whether a dismissal in those circumstances complied 
with the spirit and purport of the law of retrenchment under section 189 of the LRA. 
On the question of the fairness of the dismissal, the Court noted that the 
respondent’s argument rested on two pillars: in the first place, that the client was acting 
within the parameters of the service level agreement when deciding not to allow the 
applicant onto its premises, and secondly, that the respondent was powerless to 
prevent its client from enforcing its contractual right in terms of the agreement.10  In 
deciding on the legality of the contractual relationship, the Court referred to the 
judgment in Barkhuisen v Napier (Barkhuisen)11 where the Constitutional Court 
confirmed that in determining whether a contractual clause is against public policy 
and/or reasonable, fair and just, one must consider the constitutional values and more 
specifically the Bill of Rights, which affords every employee the right to fair labour 
practices. Clearly, this right cannot be taken away from the employee by any agreement 
concluded by the parties. Therefore, any agreement to that effect will not only be 
invalid, but will also be unconstitutional. Bado AJ held that contractual clauses will be 
held to be contra bonos mores if they conflicted with public policy and were, therefore, 
invalid and unenforceable.12  
According to the judge, public policy in this context was nothing more than an 
expression of the general sense of justice of the community.13 The Court further noted 
that, although public policy encourages freedom of contract, undoubtedly the notion of 
justice also accepts that the courts should interfere with contractual provisions, 
particularly where such provisions clearly undermine fundamental rights. Hence, the 
right not to be unfairly dismissed should be construed broadly to ensure protection of 
employees. Therefore the unfair dismissal provision would be pointless and afforded no 
adequate protection to employees, if courts were not allowed to interfere with 
contractual provisions between the labour broker and the client, particularly where 
such provisions clearly undermined the employee’s right to fair labour practices.14 
Bado AJ further referred, with approval, to the decision in Mozart Ice Cream 
Classic Franchises (Pty) Ltd v Davidoff & Another15 where the Court emphasised the need 
for the courts to be vigilant when contractual parties abused their rights. In this case, 
the Court warned that private parties could not be allowed to contract out of standards 
provided by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution).16 The 
Court also referred to Du Plessis & Others v De Klerk & Another17 where Madala J pointed 
out that the Constitution sought to eradicate the past oppressive and undemocratic 
                                                 
10 Nape at para 47. 
11 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC).   
12 Nape at paras 52-53. 
13 Nape at paras 52-53. 
14 Nape at para 54.  
15 2009 (3) SA 78 (C). 
16 Act 108 of 1996. 
17 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at para 163. 
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practices at all structures and levels of society and also to redress past racial imbalances 
in South Africa.18 The Court in Nape further referred to SA Post Office v Mampeule 
(Mampeule)19 where it was reaffirmed that parties must not structure their contractual 
rights in a manner that would severely undermine the constitutional protection 
afforded to employees by schedule 8 to the LRA, for example, by including a clause in 
the contract of employment that provides for the termination of such contract on the 
occurrence of an event such, as misconduct or incapacity.20  
The Labour Court in Nape noted that it was clear from the wording of section 23 
of the Constitution that all the stakeholders within the labour market had the right to 
fair labour practices; thus this section was capable of being interpreted widely to cover 
clients in labour broking agreements. Put differently, this section also imposes a legal 
duty on a client of a broker to respect the fundamental right of employees to fair labour 
practices.21  
Bado AJ found that clearly the plain meaning of section 198 of the LRA did not 
sanction that the labour broker and its client could limit the employee’s right not to be 
unfairly dismissed.22 Importantly, the court referred to the decision in Sidumo & Another 
v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others (Sidumo)23 where the Constitutional Court 
affirmed that the right not to be unfairly dismissed existed primarily to promote and 
guarantee job security. Consequently, the Court in Nape held that when applying the 
statutory right not to be unfairly dismissed in the context of labour broking 
arrangements, the courts will not be bound by the contractual limitations created by the 
labour broker and its client, more so where such arrangements clearly undermine the 
constitutional rights of the employees.24  The Court further drew an analogy in support 
of its reasoning that the client has a legal duty to respect the rights of employees of a 
labour broker by citing with approval the judgment in Volvo (Southern Africa) (Pty) Ltd 
v Yssel25 in which the client was permitted to proceed with an action for breach of the 
fiduciary duty against the employee, although, in principle, it was generally accepted 
that the latter was employed by the labour broker. Consequently, the client has a 
corresponding duty not to structure its own employment policies in a manner which 
undermines the constitutionally entrenched rights of an employee to fair labour 
practice.26  Therefore Bado AJ concluded that a contractual clause between the labour 
broker and client that permitted the latter to undermine the employee’s right not to be 
unfairly dismissed would be against public policy and invalid. Therefore the employer 
                                                 
18 Nape at para 56.   
19 (2009) 30 ILJ 664 (LC). 
20 Nape at para 57. 
21 Nape at para 63. 
22 Nape at para 57. 
23 [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC). 
24 Nape case at paras 64-66. The Court cited the judgments in TSI Holdings (Pty) Ltd &Others v NUMSA & 
Others [2006] 7 BLLR 631 (LAC). Similarly, the Court found that the labour broker could not rely on the 
provisions of s 189 of the Act to disguise the true reason for dismissal (referred to the judgments in CWIU 
& Others v Latex Surgical Products (Pty) Ltd [2006] 2 BLLR 14 (LAC), Perumal & Another v Tiger Brands 
[2008] 1 BLLR 58 (LC) and Oosthuizen v Telkom SA Ltd [2007] 11 BLLR 1013 (LAC). 
25 2009 (6) SA 531 (SCA).  
26 Nape at para 69. 
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should not be permitted to rely on that contractual clause to justify dismissal for 
operational reasons under section 189 of the LRA. Despite that finding, the Court noted 
that the employer can properly dismiss an employee for operational reasons where the 
client’s demand for the removal of the employee was lawful and fair.27  
4.2 Does the labour broker have a right of recourse against the client? 
The Court in Nape went further to discuss the import of section 198 of the LRA with 
regard to the possible action open to a labour broker against the client. The Court 
indicated that it was clear from the wording of section 198 that the employee of the 
labour broker had no right of recourse against the client in unfair dismissal claims. 
Despite that conclusion, the Court indicated that the labour broker still has a statutory 
duty to satisfy unfair dismissal claims of employees in the context of labour broking 
schemes as this was part of the compromise inherent to section 198 of the LRA. The 
court in Nape noted that in the present matter it was not called on to pronounce on the 
constitutional validity of section 198; hence it was not in a position to express any 
opinion on that issue.28   
The Court noted that whilst section 198 of the LRA made no specific reference to 
the right of recourse of the labour broker against the client, it did not follow that the 
former was indeed powerless to resist the client’s attempts to enforce a contractual 
provision which was in conflict with the employee’s right to fair labour practice. The 
Court relied on the judgments in Barkhuisen where it was held that in such cases the 
labour broker could approach either the Labour Court or High Court in an attempt to 
prevent the client from enforcing a contractual term which undermined the 
fundamental rights of employees. Hence, labour brokers should give consideration to 
the rights of employees when deciding to enforce such contractual rights which include 
and or relate to any form of dismissal or retrenchment under section 189 of the LRA.29  
In support of the contention on the need to recognise the labour broker’s right of 
recourse against its client, the Court in Nape stressed that such right would promote 
and guarantee job security, especially in the context of dismissals for operational 
reasons under section 189 of the LRA where in most cases an employee may be 
dismissed for considerations other than those provided for in the LRA.30 Bado AJ found 
that the client’s insistence that that the applicant be removed was unlawful and in 
breach of his right to fair labour practices. The Court further found that the applicant 
did not commit an offence which justified dismissal. Hence, the client had no right to 
insist on the application of its own e-mail policies to the employee since such conduct 
contradicted the very structure of the labour broking relationship as the client was not 
the employee’s employer. Therefore the client had no right to impose its internal 
policies on the employee particularly when they conflicted with the employee’s right 
not to be unfairly dismissed.31 
                                                 
27 Nape at paras 70-72. 
28 Nape at paras 74-75. 
29 Nape at paras 76-77. 
30 Nape at paras 82-83. 
31 Nape at para 84. 
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  The Court further held that the contractual provision between the labour broker 
and its client which allowed for the removal of the applicant from its premises was 
prima facie unlawful and against public policy, more so if it clearly undermined the 
employee’s fundamental right not to be unfairly dismissed. Finally, the court stated that 
the labour broker should have resisted its client’s attempts to rely on a contractual 
clause which undermined the employee’s constitutional right to fair labour practice. 
Therefore it was unfair for the respondent not to enforce its right of recourse against 
the client before it could even consider any form of dismissal or retrenchment under 
section 189 of the LRA.32 
Clearly, the respondent’s argument that it was entitled to invoke its contractual 
right under the labour broking agreement to terminate the employee’s employment 
contract depended entirely on principles set out in the decision in Lebowa Platinum 
Mines Ltd which is authority for the proposition that an employer can dismiss an 
employee at the behest of a third party. In rejecting the above contention, the court in 
Nape accepted that the facts of these two cases were completely different.33 First, the 
court pointed out that the circumstances of a demand for dismissal in the former case 
had sound legal foundations, since it involved a serious threat by a union to strike in 
support of the demand that the employer must remove an employee from its premises 
for making a derogatory racist comment. Secondly, the court further observed that the 
employer in Lebowa Platinum Mines Ltd was not involved in any manner in making such 
offensive racist remark. As far as Nape was concerned, the labour broker and its client 
voluntarily entered into a contractual relationship which had the potential of infringing 
the fundamental right of the employee to fair labour practice. Furthermore, the court 
opined that in casu there was no compelling evidence available which suggested that 
the client (Nissan) demanded that the applicant be dismissed other than that the 
respondent’s contention that it was acting under its contractual right to remove the 
applicant from the client’s premises.34  
Therefore, the removal of the employee from the client’s premises resulted in the 
effective dismissal of the employee since the labour broker did not provide any 
alternatives to dismissal. Nevertheless, the Court in agreed that its conclusion was still 
consistent with the finding in Lebowa Platinum Mines Ltd where that Court also 
indicated that a mere demand for the dismissal of an employee by a third party on its 
own did not render the dismissal fair under such circumstances, unless such demand 
rested on sound legal foundations. The Court concluded that the demand for the 
dismissal of an employee would usually have such foundations if it did not infringe on 
the employee’s constitutional right to fair labour practices.35  
In support of this conclusion, the Court in Nape further relied on the decision in 
Mnguni v Imperial Truck Systems (Pty) Ltd t/a Imperial Distribution (Mnguni).36 In that 
case, the employer, a labour broker, rendered some distribution services at various 
                                                 
32 Nape at paras 85-86. 
33 Nape at para 87. 
34 Nape at para 87. 
35 Nape at para 87. 
36 (2002) 23 ILJ 492 (LC). 
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clients’ premises. The dispute involved an employee of the labour broker who was 
accused of theft at one of its client’s premises. The client demanded that the employee 
be immediately removed from its premises and the employer obliged by retrenching the 
employee as there were no other alternatives available. The court held that such 
dismissal was unfair because the employer did not take any reasonable steps to 
persuade the client to drop its request. The Court further found that there was nothing 
which suggested that the client would have terminated the labour broking contract if 
the labour broker resisted its client’s demand that the employee be removed from its 
premises.37 The Court in Nape further indicated that the right of recourse of the labour 
broker may also be extended to any other arbitrary conduct by the client which clearly 
undermined the constitutionally entrenched right of an employee to fair labour 
practices. Therefore in such cases the labour broker had to approach the Labour Court 
or High Court for appropriate relief.38  
However, the Court in Nape noted that under certain circumstances it could be a 
fair labour practice for a labour broker to dismiss its employee(s), especially if the client 
threatened to cancel the entire contracts if the labour broker failed to dismiss or 
remove the employee/s from the client's premises. The same concerns were raised by 
the Labour Court in NUMSA obo Ngayi & 6 Others v Lapace Construction.39 The Court’s 
finding on the labour broker’s right of recourse against the client in this regard 
represents an important aspect of this judgment. Whilst the Court emphasised that the 
recognition of the right of recourse of the labour broker would undoubtedly alleviate 
the challenges associated with the remedy of reinstatement in the context of labour 
broking arrangements, it also acknowledged some serious procedural difficulties 
inherent in pursuing this right. However, the court suggested that the labour broker 
could still be expected to compel the client to drop its unlawful demand under these 
circumstances, for example, by issuing a third party notice if the facts and issue in 
dispute were the same. Alternatively, the employee could also join the labour broker 
and its client as respondents in the unfair dismissal dispute, especially where re-
instatement was sought.40 
The Court seemingly went further to consider whether the labour broker and 
client were jointly and severally liable to the employee in unfair dismissal claims. The 
Court noted that section 198 of the LRA went no further than state that the labour 
broker was liable for all unfair dismissal claims to its employees. The Court referred to 
LAD Labour Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Mandla (LAD Labour Brokers (Pty) Ltd)41 where the 
Labour Appeal Court simply found that the labour broker was liable for all unfair 
dismissal claims under section 198 of the LRA, without even deciding on the legality of 
the client’s demand. A similar approach was adopted by the Labour Court in State 
Information Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & 7 Others42 where the Court also 
                                                 
37 The Court also referred to the decision of the Industrial Court in Buthelezi & Others v Labour for Africa 
(Pty) Ltd (1999) 12 ILJ 588 (IC). 
38Nape at para 88.   
39 Unreported decision of Commissioner M Marcus MEGA 21381, cited in Nape paras 48 & 89. 
40 Nape at para 89. 
41 [2001] 9 BLLR 993 (LAC). 
42 [2008] 7 BLLR 611 (LAC). 
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found that the provisions of section 198 were not applicable since it was not in dispute 
that SITA was the true employer in that case.43 
The Court in Nape further found that the principles expounded in the judgment 
in Sindane v Prestige Cleaning Services (Sindane)44 on dismissal under section 198 of the 
LRA could provide some valuable guidelines to the present case. Sindane involved a 
dispute in the context of the scaling-down exercise by one of the clients of the labour 
broker which resulted in the retrenchment of two employees. A single employee 
challenged the fairness of his dismissal for operational reasons under section 189 of the 
LRA. However, the respondent (labour broker) contended that his dismissal was fair 
because it was based on fair and genuine reasons of its client pursuant to the expiry of a 
fixed-term contract whose existence undeniably would determine whether the latter 
still required his services. Although the facts of this case can be contrasted with of Nape, 
the Court nonetheless cautioned that such approach could encourage parties to contract 
out of the provisions of the LRA in contravention of section 5(2) of the LRA because this 
would effectively prevent an employee from exercising the right against unfair 
dismissals under section 189 of the LRA.45 After reviewing the principles derived from 
the above authorities, the Court accordingly found that the dismissal of the applicant in 
terms of section 189 of the LRA was substantively unfair, and the respondent was 
ordered to pay appropriate compensation together with costs.46 
5 THE DISMISSAL OF AN EMPLOYEE BY A CLIENT AND THE RECOGNITION 
OF THE RIGHT OF RECOURSE OF THE LABOUR BROKER AGAINST ITS 
CLIENT  
The decision in Nape confirms the general principles developed by the courts when 
dealing with unfair dismissal disputes of employees in response to a demand by a third 
party. Once again the court stressed that dismissal in response to a demand by a third 
party was not necessarily fair. Therefore, like any other employer, the labour broker 
could not contract out of its statutory and constitutional obligations to treat employees 
fairly.47 The principles developed by the courts in cases of dismissal at the instance of 
the third party provided some useful guidelines in determining the fairness of the 
dismissal of employees at the instance of the client in the context of labour broking 
arrangements. 
The finding in Nape is consistent with the approach adopted in Amalgamated 
Beverage Industries (Pty) Ltd v Jonker (Jonker)48 where the Court held that the mere fact 
that a third party insisted on the dismissal did not in itself render the dismissal of an 
employee to be fair. A proper investigation should have been conducted to consider all 
relevant factors before deciding to dismiss, including whether the employee was at 
fault, which was an important consideration to justify dismissal under those 
                                                 
43 Nape at paras 90-91. 
44 [2009] 12 BLLR 1249 (LC). 
45 Nape at para 92. 
46 Nape at paras 111-113. 
47 Grogan (2007) at 218. 
48 (1993) 14 ILJ 1232 (LAC) at paras 1249I-1251C. 
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circumstances. The employer must also attempt as far as possible, to take all reasonable 
and positive steps to engage the third party, to consult and also persuade him or her not 
to persist with his or her demand. Nevertheless, the employer was still expected to 
balance the harm that it would suffer from the impending threat against the potential 
injustice or inconvenience that could be caused to the concerned employee.49   
The decision in Lebowa Platinum Mines Ltd,50 affirmed the fundamental principle 
that the employer must follow an objective and holistic approach which takes into 
account a number of factors prior to dismissing an employee for incompatibility or 
incapacity. In particular, on the question of fairness of the dismissal, the demand made 
by the third party should be based on “good” and “sufficient” foundations which had to 
be backed by a “real” and “serious” threat, for instance, that the employees would 
embark on a strike action if the employee in question was not dismissed.51  
The principles set out in Lebowa Platinum Mines Ltd52 were subsequently upheld in 
Mnguni,53 by confirming the proposition that the question of fairness of the dismissal of 
an employee at the instance of the third party depended on the circumstances of each 
case, and summarised the guidelines for such cases as follows: the demand for the 
employee’s dismissal must have a “good and sufficient foundation”; the third party’s 
demand must be backed by a real and serious threat; dismissal must be the only option 
that is fair to both the employer and employee; the employer must take reasonable 
steps to dissuade the party making a demand from persisting with it; the employer must 
investigate and consider all alternatives to dismissal in consultation with the employee; 
and the employee must be made aware that the refusal to accept an alternative job will 
lead to his dismissal.54  
According to Grogan,55 the above cases have demonstrated that the rigour with 
which these guidelines will be applied in any given case depended mostly on the 
circumstances that gave rise to the demand for the employee’s dismissal. Therefore a 
court, in assessing and evaluating the fairness of the dismissal, must adopt a flexible 
approach which primarily focuses on all relevant factors. The “real reason” for, and 
cause of the demand by the third party, whether the employer explored alternatives, 
and also the bona fides of the employer should be used as relevant factors to determine 
the fairness or otherwise of dismissal under these circumstances.56  
The principles applicable to dismissals at the instance of the third party have also 
provided some useful guidelines in cases involving the dismissals of employees of 
                                                 
49 See also Erasmus v BB Bread Ltd (1987) 8 ILJ 537 (IC) at para 544C-E and SA Quilt Manufacturers 
(Pty) Ltd v Radebe (1994) 15 ILJ 115 (LAC) at paras 124E-125H. 
50 Lebowa Platinum Ltd case (1998) at para 680E-G. 
51 See, also East Rand Proprietary Mines Ltd v UPUSA (1996) 17 ILJ 1134 (LAC) at paras 1149E- 
1151A. 
52 Lebowa Platinum Ltd at paras 671E-673C. 
53 Mnguni at para 393F-G. 
54 Mnguni at para 393F-G. 
55 Grogan (2007) at 218. 
56 See also, Jonker at para 1250A, Lebowa Platinum Mines at para 1122A-B, Govender v Mondi Kraft 
(Richards Bay) (1999) 20 ILJ 2881 (LAC) at paras 2887I-2888C and Kroeger v Visual Marketing (2003) 
24 ILJ 1979 (LC) at para 1983A-C. 
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labour brokers whose clients were dissatisfied with their services (or presence) at the 
workplace. In NUMSA obo Swanepoel & Others v Oxyon Services CC,57 the client 
complained to the labour broker about one of the employees. Thereafter, the client 
terminated the employee’s services for incapacity. The arbitrator found that the 
dismissal was unfair and also emphasised that it was the labour broker’s duty as an 
employer under these circumstances to persuade the client to act fairly.58  
Finally, in Jabari v Telkom SA (Pty) Ltd59 the employee was dismissed for 
incompatibility following a disciplinary enquiry. The employee contended that his 
dismissal was automatically unfair as it was precipitated by his initiating of a grievance 
procedure against the management as well as his refusal to accept a voluntary 
retrenchment package. The Labour Court found that the employer failed to prove the 
employment relationship between the parties had irretrievably broken down to such an 
extent that it justified dismissal. The Court further found that dismissal of the employee 
amounted to victimisation for exercising his statutory rights which also amounted to an 
automatically unfair dismissal under section 187(1)(d) of the LRA.60  
It is clear from the principles developed in the cases described above that the 
emphasis is on the need for the labour broker to investigate the reasons behind the 
demand for dismissal and to consult on and consider alternatives to dismissal before 
taking the decision to dismiss the employee in question. The Court made an important 
finding on the need to recognise the labour broker’s right of recourse against its client. 
Section 198 of the LRA is silent on this issue.61 The finding of the Court on this issue will 
ensure that protection is afforded to the employees of the labour broker against the 
client as well, that is, the employees of the labour broker can now directly assert their 
rights against the client. Therefore, in searching for a proper application and 
interpretation of whether section 198 of the LRA should be construed in such a way as 
to recognise such a right, due regard must be had to the contextual framework of the 
relevant legislative provisions concerned. 
 Importantly, section 3 of the LRA provides that any person applying the Act must 
interpret its provisions in compliance with the Constitution. The Constitutional Court 
has stated in National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape 
Town & Others (UCT)62 that this section is an express injunction to interpret the 
provisions of the LRA purposefully. According to the Constitutional Court, a purposive 
approach to interpretation considers a statutory provision broadly so as to give effect to 
the constitutional values and the underlying purpose of the statute. In order to interpret 
labour legislation in compliance with the Constitution, a commissioner, arbitrator or 
judge must interpret its provisions in a way that ensures the protection, promotion and 
fulfilment of constitutional rights, in particular the right to fair labour practices in 
                                                 
57 (2004) 25 ILJ 1136 (BCA) at paras 1141J-1142A. 
58 See also, Smith and Staffing Logistics (2005) 26 ILJ 2097 (BCA) at para 2101C-E and Glass v Liberty 
Group Ltd [2007] 12 BALR 1172 (CCMA) at paras 1184E-1185B & 1186H-I. 
59 (2006) 27 ILJ 1854 (LC) at paras 1868J-1869I.  
60  Generally, see Basson AC et al Essential Labour Law 5th ed (Centurion: Labour Law Publications 2009) 
at 143-144. 
61 The Nape at paras 74-75. 
62 (2003) 24 ILJ 95 (CC) at para 41. 
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section 23 of the Constitution.63 Therefore, in search of a proper interpretation, if more 
than one interpretation can be given to a legislative provision, the decision maker must 
choose the interpretation that best gives effect to the intention of the legislature, 
provided this does not unduly restrict the intention of the statute or infringe any 
constitutionally entrenched right to fair labour practices. The Constitutional Court in 
UCT has noted that employment security is a core value of the LRA and that this fact 
should be taken into account in determining whether a person is an employee and 
therefore entitled to protection against unfair dismissal.64 Finally, section 39(2) of the 
Constitution also enjoins any court, tribunal or forum to interpret the language of any 
legislation in a manner that will promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of 
Rights consistent with the underlying constitutional values.65  
The Court in the Nape stressed that the right of recourse of the labour broker against 
its client extended further to any unlawful demand by the latter which undermined the 
employee’s right to fair labour practices.66 Therefore, in such cases the labour broker 
has the right to approach the Labour Court or High Court for appropriate relief. The 
Court also observed that recognition of the right of recourse against the client would 
promote and guarantee job security, especially in cases where employees sought 
reinstatement as a primary remedy against unfair dismissal.67 
6 THE LAW OF UNFAIR DISMISSALS IN THE CONTEXT OF LABOUR BROKING 
SCHEMES 
The question of dismissals in the context of labour broking presents some serious 
theoretical and practical problems which precipitate abuse of employees engaged in 
triangular relationships. As noted above, section 198(2) of the LRA confirms that the 
labour broker is the employer of employees whose services are supplied to or procured 
for the client. It has been noted by commentators that this fiction does not reflect the 
true nature of this relationship. According to Bosch,68 this proposition flies in the face of 
reality since employees are assigned to the client who exercises the supervisory role on 
how they discharge their duties but for the provisions of section 198(2) of the Act the 
client bears little statutory responsibility towards these employees.69 
                                                 
63 UCT at para 14 and South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence Force & Another 
1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) (SANDU) at paras 20-29. 
64 UCT at para 47. 
65 See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA &Others: In re Ex Parte President of Republic 
of South Africa & Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para 49 and Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security & Another 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC) at paras 39-40.  
66 Nape at para 66. 
67 Nape at para 89. 
68 Bosch C “Contract as a barrier to ‘dismissal’: the plight of the labour broker’s employee” (2008) 29  
ILJ 813 at 819. 
69 Bosch (2008) at 814-815. See also section 198(2) of the LRA and section 82 of the BCEA. See also 
Le Roux PAK “Protecting the employees of temporary employment services: recent decisions” (2012) 
22 (3) Contemporary Labour Law 21 at 21-27. 
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This approach was illustrated by the decision in LAD Labour Brokers (Pty) Ltd 
where the employee was confronted with the difficulty of identifying the employer in 
the triangular relationship. The Court had to decide whether the worker was an 
employee or independent contractor of the labour broker or the client. In deciding this 
question the Court suggested that the relationship was determinative by the dominant 
impression test as between the client and the labour broker. The Labour Court had an 
opportunity to finally clarify the scope and content of section 198(2) of the LRA in the 
decision in Dyokhwe v De Kock NO & Others (Dyokhwe).70 The dispute involved an 
employee of the labour broker (Mondi Packaging) who was advised to sign a contract of 
employment with the client (Adecco Recruitment Services). As the applicant was 
illiterate, he could not read and understand the content of the new employment 
contract. However, he was assured by the client that the change would not affect the 
existing terms and conditions of his employment. Thereafter, he continued working at 
the client in the same position for six years until his contract was unceremoniously 
terminated by the labour broker.  
The employee referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA joining both the 
client and the labour broker as respondents. Relying on the provisions of section 198(2) 
of the LRA, the Commissioner found that the labour broker was the true employer at the 
time of dismissal. On review, the Labour Court set aside the findings of the 
Commissioner and held that the client was his true employer. Of importance, is that the 
Court indicated that the proper wording of section 198(4) of the LRA expressly provides 
that the labour broker must “procure” or “provide” workers for the client.71  
It is worth noting that section 198(4) of the LRA provides that the client and 
labour broker are jointly and severally liable to the employee on matters enumerated 
therein, excluding unfair dismissal disputes.72 Hence, more often labour brokers and 
their clients utilise a variety of devices, for example automatic termination clauses to 
avoid possible liability in unfair dismissal claims. This approach was rejected by the 
Labour Appeal Court in South African Post Office Limited v Mampeule (SAPO v 
Mampeule).73 This dispute involved the dismissal of an employee, a chief executive 
officer and director of a company by its shareholders. His contract of employment 
incorporated a clause which stipulated, amongst others, that the employment contract 
would automatically terminate when he ceased to be a board member. Hence, the 
                                                 
70 [2012] 10 BLLR 102 (LC). 
71 Dyokhwe at paras 73-76. 
72 Section 198(4) of the LRA provides that the client and labour broker are jointly and severally liable 
for contravention of collective agreements, the BCEA and determinations made in terms of the Wage 
Act. See Bosch (2008) at 815 and Benjamin P “To regulate or to ban? Controversies over temporary 
employment agencies in South Africa and Namibia” in Malherbe & Sloth-Nielsen (eds) Labour law into 
the future: essays in honour of D’Arcy du Toit (Cape Town: Juta 2012) 189 at 200 and Dyokhwe at para 
44. Further, see Botes A “Answers to questions? A critical analysis of the amendments to the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 with regard to labour brokers”(2014) 26 South African Mercantile Law Journal 
110 at 119-123 for a critical analysis of the concept of joint and several liability of the client and labour 
broker under section 198(4) of the LRA. 
73 LAC case no: JA29/09 (4 June 2010). 
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employer argued that there was no dismissal for the purposes of the Act when he was 
eventually removed from the board by the shareholders. The Court rejected the 
argument of the employer and found that the automatic termination clause was void. 
Furthermore, the Court stressed that the employee’s right not to be unfairly dismissed 
gave effect to the constitutional right to fair labour practices, and that it was one of the 
manifestations of that right.74 However, the same court reached a different conclusion in 
Sindane. This matter involved an unfair dismissal following the termination of a fixed 
term contract by the employer as a result of a scaling down of the business of its client. 
On the facts the Court found that the termination of the contract under certain 
circumstances did not constitute dismissal for purposes of the LRA as in this case where 
the scaling down of the client’s business was at issue.75  
Subsequently, in Mahlamu v CCMA & Others (Mahlamu)76 the Labour Court held 
that automatic termination clauses were void for contravening the provisions of section 
5 of the LRA which prohibited contracting-out of the provisions of the Act, including, in 
that case, the employee’s right not to be unfairly dismissed.77 Despite this conclusion, 
the Court clarified that such finding should not be construed to deem termination of a 
genuine fixed term contract a dismissal for the purposes of section 186(1) (b) of the 
LRA, where the parties had agreed to and anticipated such event, for example, on 
completion of a project. Put simply, that is, if the parties agreed that they will be 
engaged in terms of a fixed-term contract the end of the term being clearly defined by 
the occurrence of a specific event, without converting the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed to a conditional right.78 
Finally, most often labour brokers utilise “take back clauses” or “substitution 
clauses” in terms of which an employee is given employment for an indefinite or 
intermittent period. However, if the employee is not deployed he or she remains in the 
workforce without pay. Put differently, the employment relationship endures 
notwithstanding the periods of unemployment; hence the labour broker argues that 
there is no dismissal for the purposes of the LRA.79 This approach was rejected by the 
SCA in National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa and Others v Abancedisi Labour 
                                                 
74 SAPO v Mampeule at para 21.  
75
 See Giles F “Labour broking: validity of ‘fixed-term eventuality’ employment contracts”. Available at 
http://gilesfiles.co.za/05-labour-cout-judgments/labour-broking-validity-of-%E20%9Cfixed-term 
eventuality%E2%80%D-employment-contracts (accessed on 1 November 2014). 
76 (2011) 32 ILJ 1122 (LC). 
77 Mahlamu at paras 13-22.  
78 Mahlamu at para 23. Generally, see Le Roux (2012) at 25-27, Le Roux PAK “Automatic termination 
of employment: The Labour Courts express scepticism” (2010) 19 (11) Contemporary Labour Law 101 
and Harvey S “Labour brokers and workers’ rights: can they co-exist in South Africa?” (2011) SALJ 100 
at 108-110. See also Lawrence I & Moodley J “Perils of automatic termination clauses in labour broking 
context”, The Mercury 30 September 2013 at 3. Available at http://www.polity.org.za/article/the-perils 
of-automatic termination-clauses-in-a-labour-broking-context-2011-10-13 (accessed 30 May 2015).  
79 See, Harvey (2011) at 110. Further, see Bosch (2008) at 834-839 for a discussion of the status of 
employees who remain on the books of the labour broker when their assignment with a client comes to 
an end without payment of their salaries. 
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Services (Abancedisi).80 The dispute arose from the dismissal of employees of the labour 
broker who were denied access to the workplace following a two-hour strike action at 
the client’s premises. Consequently, the striking employees were ordered to sign a code 
of conduct designed to regulate industrial action. Those employees who refused to sign 
the code were denied entry into the client’s premises and eventually replaced with new 
employees. Subsequently, the excluded employees referred an alleged unfair dismissal 
dispute to the bargaining council. The employer argued that there was no dismissal, that 
is, the referral of unfair dismissal was premature since they still formed part of its 
workforce; which argument was upheld by the council, the Labour Court and also 
confirmed by the LAC. On appeal, the SCA found, amongst others, that the exclusion of 
the employees from the client’s premises coupled with the illusionary retention without 
pay constituted a serious breach of the employment contract which entitled the 
aggrieved parties to cancel it.81 On the facts, the SCA found that the attitude of the 
labour broker was consistent with the allegations of the employees that they were 
dismissed, for instance, the former did not take any steps to consider alternative 
employment or propose possible retrenchment procedures for the excluded 
employees.82 Accordingly, the dismissal was found to be substantively and procedurally 
unfair and the employer was ordered to pay compensation and costs.83  
Even if the dismissal of employees in the triangular relationship is found to be 
unfair, the employee will still be confronted with the difficulty of enforcing the remedy 
of re-instatement. As noted by Harvey,84 the remedy of re-instatement is a “hollow 
remedy” in triangular relationships since the labour broker can provide neither the 
workplace nor income as both are derived from the client.85 Clearly, none of the judicial 
and academic pronouncements discussed above dealt with the contextual 
constitutionality of section 198(4) of the LRA as an unjustified limitation of the 
employee’s right not to be unfairly dismissed. The unjustifiable limitation lies in the fact 
that section 198(4) excludes joint and several liability of the client and the labour 
broker in dismissal disputes. It is proposed in this article that the question can be 
answered by considering the constitutional and legislative structure of section 198 of 
the LRA. Therefore, section 198(4) of the LRA must be interpreted in a manner that 
conforms to the fundamental right to fair labour practice.86 As a starting point, section 
39(2) of the Constitution enjoins courts to interpret the provisions of the LRA in a 
manner that seeks to promote the spirit, purpose of object of the Constitution. 
Furthermore, section 3 of the LRA enjoins any person applying the LRA to interpret its 
                                                 
80 [2013] 12 BLLR 1185 (SCA). 
81 Abancedisi at para 15. 
82 Abancedisi at para 17. 
83 Section 186(1) (e) of the LRA. See Basson, Le Roux & Strydom (2009) at 91-95 for a detailed 
discussion of constructive dismissals under section 185 of the LRA. Generally, see Harvey (2011) at 
108-113 for a detailed discussion of the difficulty of managing dismissals within the context of labour 
broking schemes. 
84 Harvey (2011) at 113 and Harvey S (2009) “Labour brokers and workers’ rights: can they co-exist in 
South Africa?” (Unpublished LLM dissertation, University of Cape Town) at 22. 
85 Harvey (2009) at 31-32. 
86 See Benjamin (2012) at 200 and Dyokhwe at paras 42-43. 
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provisions in a manner that complies with the Constitution and public international 
law87 and also gives effect to the primary objectives of the LRA.88 Therefore, an 
important source of international law in interpreting section 198 of the LRA is the ILO 
Convention on Private Employment Agencies 181 of 1997 (CPEA)89 which, amongst 
others, seeks to ensure that adequate measures are put in place to extend protection to 
employees engaged by temporary employment agencies.90  
In addition, the ILO Recommendation Concerning Employment Relationships 
198 of 2006 (RCER) enjoins Member States to combat all forms of disguised 
employment that have the potential of depriving employees of their entitlements to 
statutory labour law protection.91 Importantly, the Recommendation enjoins a person 
when determining the employment relationship in the context of disguised employment 
to look at the true relationship, notwithstanding the description proffered by the 
parties.92 In UCT, the Constitutional Court emphasised that one of the core purposes of 
the LRA was to promote job security, especially the employee’s right not to be unfairly 
dismissed under section 185 of the LRA.93 In Sidumo, the Constitutional Court observed 
that section 185 refers to “right”, that is, the right not to be unfairly dismissed is a hard-
won and well-deserved right which is essential to give effect to the constitutional 
imperative for fair labour practice.94 Hence, the social and historical significance of the 
labour rights embodied in the Constitution and protective legislation suggested that 
those rights should not be lightly limited.95  
                                                 
87 See also the decision in SANDU at para 25, NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd & Another (2003) 24 ILJ 
305 (CC) at para 26 and Equity Aviation (Pty) Ltd v SATAWU & Others [2009] 10 BLLR 933 (LAC) 
(Equity Aviation) at para 26 where the Constitutional Court acknowledged that international conventions 
and treaties constituted important sources for the interpretation of the constitutional right to fair labour 
practices. See also the judgment in Discovery Health Case v CCMA & Others [2008] 7 BLLR 633 (LC) 
at para 28. Further, see sections 232 and section 233 of the Constitution which generally deal with the 
status and application of international law under South African law. 
88 Section 39(2) of the Constitution. Further, see Cohen T “Debunking the legal fiction-Dyokhwe v De 
Kock No & Others” (2012) 33 ILJ 2318 at 2319-2322.  
89 The CPEA was adopted in 1998 and came into force on 10 May 2000. 
90
 See, Cohen (2012) at 2321. See also Dyokhwe at paras 32-34 for a brief discussion of the interpretative 
guidelines provided by the CPEA in the context of labour broking schemes under South African law. 
91 The RCER was adopted on 15 June 2006. See also Cohen (2012) at 2321 and Dyokhwe at para 35. 
92 Paragraph 9 of the RCER. See also Cohen (2012) at 2321 and Dyokhwe at paras 35-36 for a brief 
discussion of the Recommendation. See also Dyokhwe at para 36. Further, see Dyokhwe at paras 32 
36 for a brief discussion of the role of international law as an interpretative guideline for section 198 of  
the LRA.  
93 UCT at para 42 and Bosch (2008) at 831. 
94 Sidumo at para 74. The same view was also expressed by the Labour Court in FAWU & Others v Pet 
Products (Pty) Ltd (2000) 21 ILJ 1100 (LC) at para 15 where the Court indicated that the rights 
entrenched in the Constitution were hard-earned and well-deserved rights. See also, Harvey (2011) at 
103 where the author suggests that the legislative history and purpose of the LRA should be taken into 
account in interpreting the content of the constitutional right to fair labour practices, especially, the 
employee’s right not to be unfairly dismissed. 
95 Harvey (2011) at 104-105.  
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This right not to be unfairly dismissed is also given effect by international law 
under the Convention on Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer 
158 of 1982 (CTEIE) which seeks to provide guidelines to promote job-security by 
ensuring that the employer does not dismiss at will.96 Of importance, is that sections 
188-189 of the LRA provide that the employment of an employee shall not be 
terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termination related to the conduct or 
capacity of the employee or based on operational reasons.97 Therefore, section 198 
should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the underlying imperatives of 
the Constitution and LRA to promote job security especially the employee’s right not be 
unfairly dismissed. One of the purposes of the LRA is to “advance economic 
development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace”.98 
This approach was adopted in the context of dismissals under labour broking schemes 
in Dyokhwe99 to determine whether it would be against public policy to enforce a 
contractual clause between a client and a labour broker that undermined the 
employee’s right not to be unfairly dismissed. The Court indicated that public policy is a 
factual issue which must be determined according to the merits of each case. Clearly, in 
the context of labour broking schemes, the unequal bargaining relationship of the 
parties is one of the most important factors which could justify the protection of 
employee’s right against unfair dismissals.100  
Furthermore, the surrounding circumstances at the time of conclusion of the 
contract can also provide some valuable guidelines, for example, in Dyokhwe, the Court 
found, amongst others, that the employee was in a weakest and vulnerable bargaining 
position because he was illiterate and unable to read and understand the consequences 
of the contract when signing it.101 Therefore, the courts should adopt a purposive 
approach in interpreting section 198 of the LRA to promote the primary objectives of 
the LRA which include job security.102 Most academics agree that section 198(4) is 
capable of being interpreted purposively so as to extend the joint and several liability 
provision to clients in unfair dismissal disputes.103 In addition, it is proposed in this 
article that a new section, section 186(1)(g), be inserted into the LRA that would define 
“unfair  dismissal” to include any contractual arrangement between the client and 
labour broker which has the effect of contracting out of the statutory protection of the 
                                                 
96 Article 4 of the CTEIE. See Equity Aviation at para 26. 
97 Sections 188-189 of the LRA. See, Bosch (2008) at 824-825 and Equity Aviation at paras 26-27. 
98 Section 1 of the LRA. 
99 Dyokhwe at paras 67-72. 
100 Dyokhwe at paras 67-72. See also Bosch (2008) at 819-820 & 826-829 and Cohen (2012) at 2325- 
2326. 
101 Dyokhwe at para 72. 
102  See, UCT at para 41 (see also the cases cited at footnote 47 of the judgment). 
103 See Tshoose C & Tsweledi B “A critique of the protection afforded to non-standard workers in a 
temporary employment services context in South Africa” (2014) 18 Law, Democracy and Development 
334 at 345. 
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right not to be unfairly dismissed. This would also bring the situation in line with 
section 197 transfer dismissals.104 
7 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS FOR THE 
REGULATION OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SERVICES UNDER THE LRA 
The Amendment Act has introduced some significant changes to section 198 which have 
far-reaching implications for the protection of employees engaged in labour broking 
schemes. Section 198 of the LRA still applies generally to employees of the labour 
broker, whilst section 198A extends protection to employees earning below the income 
threshold under the BCEA.105 Therefore, the new section 198A of the LRA recognises 
only three categories of labour broking schemes, namely, (1) work of less than three 
months; (2) employees who substitute for a permanent employee of the client who is 
temporary absent; and (3) work which is temporarily in terms of a collective agreement 
or sectoral determination.106 Consequently, any low-paid employee contracted in terms 
of a labour broking agreement which falls outside the above three schemes will be 
deemed to be the employee of the client.107 The implications of this construction is that 
such low-paid employee will be entitled to proceed directly against the client, for 
example, in any dispute concerning unfair dismissal or unfair labour practice.108  
According to Van Niekerk et al,109 the scope of section 198A (1) of the LRA poses 
some potential difficulties. First, it is not clear whether this subsection must be 
interpreted so as to mean that an employee automatically becomes the employee of the 
client or will just be deemed to be in that position for the purposes of the employer’s 
statutory liability. It is suggested that the most plausible interpretation is that the 
employees should remain in the service of the labour broker; however, they will be 
deemed to be the employees of the client only for the purposes of enforcement of 
statutory rights against the client.110 It is submitted that if this was not the case, the 
legislature could have indicated expressly, for example, that the employment contracts 
                                                 
104 Generally, see Basson (2009) at 177-187 for a detailed discussion of section 197 transfers. 
105 See, clause 44 of the Labour Relations Amendment Bill 2012. Available at 
https://jutalaw.co.za/media/filestore/2012/05b_16_-_2012_-_Labour_Relations_AB.pdf (accessed 30 
May 2014), which introduced the new section 198A-D to the principal Act, entitled “The application of 
section 198A-D to employees earning below the income threshold”. Section 6(3) of the BCEA provides 
that the Minister may determine this amount from time to time in the Government Gazette. Currently 
the amount has been capped at R205 435-30 with effect from 1 July 2014 (see GG 37795: GN 531 of 
1 July 2014)). See also Rheeder J “The future of labour brokers in terms of the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act 2012”. Available at http://www.jrattorneys.co.za/south-african-labour-labour-law-case 
articles/legislations-and-labour-law amendments.html (accessed 17 June 2014). 
106 Section 198A (1) LRA. See also Van Niekerk et al (2015) at 70. 
107 Section 198(1) read with s 198A (3) of the LRA.  
108
 See “Memorandum of objects, Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012” (Explanatory 
Memorandum).Available at 
http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/downloads/legislation/bills/proposedamendmentbills/memoofobjectslra 
pdf (accessed 13 December 2014). 
109 Van Niekerk et al (2015) at 71.  
110 Van Niekerk et al (2015) at 70. 
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as well as the rights and obligations of the labour broker’s employees are automatically 
transferred to the client, for example, after three months.111 Therefore, on a literal 
reading of sections 198A (1)-(2) of the LRA the labour broking agreement will be 
deemed to be for an indefinite period and the client will be deemed to be the 
employer.112  
Furthermore, section 198A (3) of the LRA empowers the Minister to deem 
certain employees of the labour broker earning below the statutory income threshold to 
be employees of a client.113 First, section 198A (3)(a) of the LRA confirms that a labour 
broker’s employees providing services to a client under “genuine labour broking 
agreements” remain employees of the labour broker. This conclusion can be inferred 
from paragraph (a) of the subsection which defines such employee with reference to the 
definition of “temporary employment services” as contemplated in terms of section 
198A(1).114 Although the provisions of this paragraph are couched negatively, they 
simply recognise that employees of the labour broker providing services under a 
genuine labour broking agreement remain employees of the labour broker. Conversely, 
employees who no longer provide “temporary services” will be deemed to be 
permanent employees of the client, unless the provisions relating to fixed term 
contracts apply.115  
Secondly, section 198A (3)(b) of the LRA provides that “employees of the labour 
broker not performing temporary services to the client” will be deemed to be employed 
indefinitely by the client, unless the provisions relating to fixed term employees do 
apply (added emphasis).116 The provisions of 198A (3)(b) of the LRA are confusing in 
many respects; however, it is submitted that there are two schools of thought regarding 
application of the provisions of this paragraph. First, it can be interpreted to mean that 
the employee becomes an employee of the client and ceases to be an employee of the 
labour broker.117 Secondly, it appears that the employee remains an employee of the 
labour broker but it is also deemed to be an employee of the client for the purposes of 
statutory liability under the LRA.118 It seems that the latter construction is inconsistent 
                                                 
111 Van Niekerk et al (2015) at 70. 
112 Section 198A (3) (b) LRA. See also Van Niekerk et al (2015) at 71. 
113 Section 198A(3) of the  LRA provides: “For the purposes of this Act, an “employee”-performing a 
temporary service as contemplated in subsection (1) for the client is the employee of the temporary 
employment services in terms of section 198(2), or not performing such temporary service of the client 
is- deemed to be the employee of that client and the client is deemed to be the employer; and subject to 
the provisions of section 198B, employed on an indefinite basis by the client.”  
114 Section 198A (3) (a) LRA. 
115 Van Niekerk et al (2015) at 71. Generally, see the Explanatory Memorandum at 24-26 for a detailed  
discussion of fixed term contracts under the new 198B of the LRA. 
116 Section 198(3) (b) LRA. 
117
 Comments on the Labour Relations Amendment Bill and Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment Bill.  
Furnished by Solidarity Trade Union (June 2012) at 10 (Solidarity Research Institute  
Commentary) at 10. Available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/docs/120731solidarity_0.pdf (accessed 20 June 2014).  
118 Solidarity Research Institute at 10. 
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with the general nature of the labour broking relationship under section 198 of the 
LRA.119  
However, it seems that the legislature reaffirms that the Minister may deem low-
paid employees not performing temporary service for the client to be employees of the 
client and the latter is deemed to be their employer.120 Furthermore, these employees 
will also be deemed to be permanent employees of the client, unless the client can prove 
that they have been engaged in terms of a “genuine fixed term contract” as 
contemplated by section 198B of the LRA.121 It is suggested that this paragraph is aimed 
at counteracting any attempt by the client to circumvent the operation of the provisions 
of section 198A, for example, by engaging casual employees or other non-standard 
employees.122  
The confusion whether there is a dual relationship or whether the client is the 
sole employer as created by the deeming provision in section 198A (3(b) of the LRA 
came under scrutiny in two recent arbitration awards, Mphirime v Value Logistics Ltd/ 
BDM Staffing (Pty) Ltd123 and Assign Services (Pty) Ltd v Krost Shelving & Racking (Pty) 
Ltd (NUMSA)124 where the arbitrators found that the client is the sole employer of the 
labour broker’s employees earning below the statutory threshold after three months for 
the purposes of the LRA. More recently, the Labour Court in Assign Services (Pty) Ltd v 
CCMA & Others (Assign Services (Pty) Ltd),125 per Brassey AJ, reviewed and set aside the 
CCMA Commissioner’s award that the client became the sole employer of the labour 
broker’s employee after the placement of three months. The Court was called upon to 
decide whether the Commissioner had erred by finding that the deeming provision 
meant that the client of the labour broker became the sole employer of the labour 
broker’s employees earning below the income threshold after expiry of three months of 
their placement. The Court noted that the crisp question was whether the labour broker 
continues to be the employer even after the application of the deeming provision. The 
Court found that on a proper reading of section 198A (3) of the LRA, the client becomes 
the employer for the purposes of the operation of the LRA. Put differently, the client is 
not jointly and severally liable as employer for any other statutory obligations in 
respect the labour broker’s employee other than those generated under the LRA, for 
                                                 
119 Van Niekerk et al (2015) at 71. 
120 Section 198A (3) (b) (i) LRA. 
121 Section 198A (3(b)(ii) LRA. 
122 Du Toit J “Amendments to labour legislation-temporary employees. Available at 
http://www.labourguide.co.za./most-recent/898-amendments-to-labour-legislation-
temporaryemployees (accessed 20 June 2014). Further, see Botes (2014) at 132-134 for a discussion of 
possible interpretations which can be attached to 198(3)(b) of the LRA. For a critical discussion of the 
possible meanings to be attached to 198A (3)(b) of the LRA, see Grogan J “The new dispensation, Part 1: 
The amendments to the LRA” (2014) 30(3) Employment Law 4 and s 198A(3)(b)(i) of the LRA “The 
argument in favour of dual employment”. Available at 
http://www.capes.org.za/.cm4all/iproc.php/The%20Argument%20in%20favour%20of%20Dual%20Em
ployment%20-LRA%20s198A(3)(b)(i).pdf?cdp=a (accessed 30 May 2015) for a critical discussion of the 
possible meanings that could be attached to section 198A (3)(b) of the LRA.  
123 NBCRFLI FSRFBC34922 [24 June 2015]. 
124 CCMA ECEL 1652-15 [26 June 2015]. 
125 [2015] BLLR 1160 (LC). 
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example, the contractual rights between the labour broker and employee arising from 
the contract of employment. 126   
After making that finding, the Court went further to consider whether the labour 
broker ceased to be the employer if the deeming provisions in section 198A were 
triggered. The Court found that the labour broker continued to be an employer of its 
employees notwithstanding the application of the deeming provision. The Court noted 
that there was nothing in principle or practice which suggested that the labour broker 
should be relieved of its statutory rights and obligations toward its employees; the 
client has merely acquired a parallel set of such rights and obligations by virtue of 
operation of the deeming provisions.127 Therefore the labour broker was concurrently 
vested with rights and obligations generated by the LRA. The Court found that the 
deeming provision did not invalidate the contract of employment between the labour 
broker and its employees or even derogated from its terms.128 Of importance was that 
the Court confirmed that the deeming provision was intended to only operate against 
the client for the purposes of the LRA.129 Hence, the deeming provision was introduced 
specifically to operate for the purposes of the LRA, and thus it served to amplify or 
extend the pre-existing statutory protections afforded to employees against the labour 
broker (true employer). Therefore, the deeming provision under section 198A (3) of the 
LRA was created to serve as an augmentation instead of a substitution of the existing 
statutory protection of the labour broker’s employees against its client.130  
The essence of the Labour Court finding was that the employment relationship 
between the labour broker and its employees remained intact; however, by virtue of the 
deeming provision the employees could now assert their rights arising from the LRA 
against the client (added emphasis). Therefore, the Court’s approach on the 
interpretation of the deeming provision in section 198A (3) of the LRA clearly 
demonstrated judicial support for the dual employment approach. Consequently, the 
labour broker’s employees were not automatically transferred to the client as sole 
employer after the application of the deeming provision.131 Despite that finding, the 
Labour Court warned that the extensive scope and exigibility of those proffered 
legislative protections introduced by the amendments will undoubtedly attract 
considerable litigation in future, unless the Labour Appeal Court finally clarifies this 
issue.132 The decision in Assign Services (Pty) Ltd was relied on by the arbitrator in 
National Union of Mineworkers of South Africa obo Nkala & others v Durpo Workforce 
Solutions133 where it was found that for all the purposes of labour legislation, except for 
                                                 
126 Assign Services (Pty) Ltd at paras 10-11 & 15. 
127 Assign Services (Pty) Ltd at para 12. 
128 Assign Services (Pty) Ltd at para 11. 
129 Assign Services (Pty) Ltd at para 11. 
130 Assign Services (Pty) Ltd at para 14. 
See also Patel A “Judgment on the interpretation of the ‘deeming provision’: sole or dual?” Available at 
http://www.labourguide.co.za/most-recent/2135-judgment-on-the-interpretation-of-sole-or-dual 
(accessed 29 September 2015). 
132 Assign Services (Pty) Ltd at paras 16 & 18.  
133 [2016] 3 BALR 229 (MEIBC).  
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 20 (2016) 
 
Page | 127  
 
the LRA, the temporary employment service remained the employer of the placed 
employees.134  
Regrettably, the legislature does not provide any guidelines as to who bears the 
onus of proof to establish whether a person is an employee of the client in the above 
circumstances. However, it is generally accepted that an employee bears the onus of 
proof, and in the event of doubt, the traditional legislative and judicial tests will always 
provide some useful guidelines to determine the employment relationship.135 The 
amendments introduced by section 198A of the LRA address a variety of challenges 
encountered by employees in labour broking arrangements, for example, in Nape and 
the series of cases discussed above where the labour broker or employee did not have 
any right of recourse against the client to promote and protect the employee’s right to 
fair labour practice.136  
Furthermore, the legislature also thwarts any attempt by a client to circumvent 
the application of the deeming provision, for example, by terminating the employment 
relationship after the expiry of three months. Any termination under those 
circumstances constitutes a dismissal for the purposes of the LRA.137 In addition, section 
200B has been inserted to provide some form of joint and several liability between the 
client and labour broker towards the labour broker’s employee for breach of any 
statutory obligations in terms of labour laws. Importantly, section 200B of the LRA 
provides that “for the purposes of this Act or any other employment legislation the 
‘employer’ includes one or more persons who is carrying business or on associated or 
related activity or business through an employer with intent or effect of defeating the 
purposes of the LRA or other employment laws”.138 Therefore the court will more 
readily be prepared to “pierce the corporate veil” and identify the true employer where 
the client and the labour broker act fraudulently to conceal the true nature of the 
employment relationship, for example, by attempting to hide behind a bogus corporate 
identity.139  
Equally, in an attempt to enforce equal treatment, section 198A (5) of the LRA 
provides that the client must treat employees deemed to be its employees under the Act 
on terms and conditions of employment that are, on the whole, not less favourable than 
of those existing employees of the client performing the same or similar work, unless 
                                                 
134
 Also Van Wyk J, Van Heerden A & Jacobs S “Contracts of temporary employment services employees”. 
Available at http://www.labourguide.co.za/most-recent/2256-contracts-of-temporary-employment-services-
employees, (accessed 15 June 2016). 
135 See Du Plessis JV & Fouchě MA A practical guide to labour law 6th ed (Durban: LexisNexis 2006) at 10-
12 and Basson et al (2009) at 24-32 for a detailed discussion of the legislative and judicial approaches to 
establish an employment relationship. 
136 See the current section 198 of the LRA.   
137 Section 198A (4) LRA. Consequently, an employee can, for example, institute an action for an 
alleged unfair dismissal against the client after expiry of three months. 
138 Sections 200B (1)-(2) LRA. 
139 See, for example, the decision in Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union  v Lane (NO) (1993) 
14 ILJ 1366 (IC) and Kruger v Jigsaw Holdings Limited & Others (2006) 27 ILJ 1161 (LC). Generally, 
see Grogan (2007) at 26-28 for a detailed discussion of the term “employer” for the purposes of labour 
law. 
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justifiable reasons exist for different treatment.140 Similarly, the legislature does not 
provide guidelines for the dispute resolution of different treatment; however, it is 
suggested that under these circumstances the employee can resign and allege 
“constructive dismissal” as envisaged by section 186(1)(e) of the LRA.141 Alternatively, 
an employee can tender their resignation by relying on the provisions of section 
186(1)(f) of the LRA that the new employer (the client) has provided terms and 
conditions which are substantially less favourable than those provided by the earlier 
employer (labour broker) pursuant to transfer of business as a going concern under 
section 197 of the Act. 142 Clearly, the provisions of section 198A of the LRA will not 
trigger section 197 of the Act which, amongst others, require that there must be a 
“transfer of business” from one employer to another as a going concern.143  
Another interesting question is whether section 198A (3)(b) renders the 
provisions of section 198(4) of the LRA, which provide for joint and several liability of 
the labour broker and client for matters enumerated under the latter section, 
superfluous.144 It seems that the legislature contradicts itself on this issue. Clearly, the 
question of joint and several liability will not arise in cases of low-income employees 
since the client will be regarded as employer if any one of the circumstances envisaged 
in section 198A(1) read with section 198(4) of the LRA is present.145 However, 
according to Botes,146 the status of the client in terms of section 198(4) read with 
section 198(3)(b) of the LRA implies that the labour broker could still be held severally 
liable even though the client is deemed to be the employer under section 198A(3)(b) of 
the LRA. Put differently, the client’s employer status does not change the original 
position with regard to liabilities under section 198(4) of the LRA, that is, despite the 
deeming provision of section 198A(3)(b) of the LRA, the client still retains some 
employer status to a certain degree.147 It seems that this latter construction is preferred 
by most academics since it is consistent with the very spirit and purposes of temporary 
employment services under the LRA. 148  
                                                 
140 Section 198A (5) LRA. 
141 Section 186(1) (e) LRA. See Botes (2014) at 134. Generally, see Basson et al (2009) 
at  91-95 for a detailed discussion of general principles developed by case law in the context of 
“constructive dismissals” under section 185(1)(e) LRA. 
142 Section 186(1) (f) LRA. See also Basson Le Roux & Strydom (2009) at 95 for a brief discussion of  
“transfer dismissals” under section 186(1) (f) of the LRA.  
143 Sections 197 & 197A LRA.  Further, see Basson, Le Roux & Strydom  (2009) at 177-187, Du Plessis 
& Fouchě (2006) at 283-284 and Grogan (2007) at 248-255 for an analysis of the principles developed 
by case law relating to transfer of employment contracts under section 197 of the LRA.  
144 Section 198(4) of the LRA provides for liability of the client and the labour broker for any 
contravention of the BCEA or collective agreement, etc. Compare the current section 198(4) with section 
198A (3) (b) of the LRA. 
145 Compare section 198A (3) (b) with section 198(4) of the LRA. 
146 Botes (2014) at 32. 
147 Botes (2014) at 132. Generally, see Botes (2014) at 131-134 for the possible interpretations that can 
be attached to section 198A (3) (b) of the LRA on the scope of the deeming provision of the client as 
employer of the labour broker’s employees. 
148 See, for example, Botes (2014) at 128-134 and Van Niekerk et al (2015) at 70-71. Further, see 
Bosch C “The proposed 2012 amendments relating to non-standard employment: what will the new 
regime be?” (2013) 34 ILJ 1631.  
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Finally, it is regrettable that the legislature did not clearly address any possible 
right of recourse of the labour broker and/or the employee against the client if the latter 
refused to comply with its obligations in terms of section 198A of the LRA, discussed 
above.149 Although the legislature has attempted to alleviate the plight of low-income 
employees of the labour broker, some very serious concerns which precipitated these 
amendments will still persist particularly in cases involving highly-paid employees 
engaged in labour broking schemes. It remains to be seen how the labour courts will 
interpret some of the problematic issues raised by the amendments under section 198A 
of the LRA.  
8 CONCLUSION  
The crux of the decision in Nape is that in order for the dismissal of the employee at the 
instance of the client (third party) to be fair, the employer must prove that the dismissal 
of the employee is for fair reasons which are consistent with constitutional principles 
and the objects of the LRA. Therefore, in applying and interpreting the right not to be 
unfairly dismissed in the context of employment services, a court will more readily not 
enforce any contractual provision which clearly undermines the employee’s 
constitutional rights to fair labour practices.150 This decision clearly illustrates the need 
for a comprehensive regulation in terms of which labour brokers would play a positive 
and crucial role in the enforcement and protection of the employee’s fundamental rights 
in labour broking arrangements.  
Most importantly, the principles expounded in Nape also serves as a stern 
warning to labour brokers and their clients that they should structure their 
employment policies and agreements in such a way as to conform to the fundamental 
right of employees to fair labour practices.151 Although the amendments discussed 
above attempted to extend protection to low-paid employees engaged in labour broking 
schemes, most of these provisions cause some serious problems of interpretation. For 
example, there are still some uncertainties as to the scope of application of the deeming 
provision in section 198A (3) of the LRA concerning who is the employer of a labour 
broker’s employees earning income below the statutory threshold after the expiry of 
three months. Clearly, the interpretation of this section will cause some serious 
practical problems which would require some urgent legislative intervention. It is 
suggested that in the absence of clear legislative guidelines, the deeming provision and 
other related provisions in section 198A of the LRA should be interpreted in a manner 
which is consistent with the general structure of temporary employment services under 
section 198 of the LRA. 
Regrettably, the legislature did not take the opportunity to clearly address the 
complexities created by the lack of an effective remedy for the labour broker and/or its 
                                                 
149 See Botes (2014) at 133-134 for an analysis of the possible remedies that may be available to either 
the labour broker or the employee if the client does not comply with its obligations under section 198A  
of the LRA. 
150 Nape at paras 64-67. 
151 See Alexander M “Labour brokers: where to now?” Available at 
http://www.deneysreitz.co.za/indexphp/news/labours where to now/ (accessed 12 February 2011). 
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employees against the client in temporary employment schemes. Even though the 
legislature’s intention may have subsequently changed in that the client will now be 
deemed to be the employer for the purposes of statutory liability under certain 
circumstances, this situation is still speculative. Therefore in the absence of any 
statutory provision on this issue, it is believed that the decision in Nape on the need to 
recognise the labour broker’s right of recourse is still instructive. In this case the Labour 
Court illustrated the practical challenges posed by labour broking arrangements on the 
enforcement of rights by the labour broker/and its employees vis-à-vis the client. 
Consequently, the question of the right of recourse of the labour broker/and its 
employees against the client should be left open for the courts to fashion such remedy 
through purposive interpretation of section 198 of the LRA, given the proffered 
employee protectionist aims underlying both the LRA and more recent legislative 
amendments.  
Hopefully, in the absence of any clear legislative guidelines, the decision in Nape 
will undoubtedly still serve as authority for future interpretation of section 198 of the 
LRA which is consistent with the employees’ protection against unfair dismissal in the 
context of temporary employment services. It is unfortunate that the employee in Nape 
requested monetary compensation. It remains to be seen what approach the courts will 
adopt where the relief granted is in the form of re-instatement in future.  
 
 
